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Abstract: Social acceptance of nuclear power has become a decisive factor in framing a sustainable
energy policy. This study examines social acceptance for cancelling the construction of planned
nuclear power plants (NPPs) and replacing them with other energy sources. The contingent valuation
method (CVM) and cost–benefit analysis (CBA) are used to access the social acceptance and financial
feasibility of such projects. Empirical analysis is based on the case of South Korea, where a similar
policy is in progress under the new government. The CVM results show that a Korean household was
willing to pay an additional KRW 1922.45/month (USD 1.80/month) for replacing seven 1-Gigawatt
NPPs with other energy sources, which is about 3.5% of a household’s current electricity bill.
The CBA suggests that the annual costs of replacing this amount of nuclear power capacity with
renewables or liquefied natural gas is KRW 1291.40 billion (USD 1.21 billion) or KRW 1180.38 billion
(USD 1.11 billion) larger than its benefits, which amounts to about 3% of total annual electricity
generation costs in South Korea. As the additional costs of nuclear power replacement cannot be fully
covered by the mean willingness-to-pay of the current acceptance level, moderate levels of social
resistance are expected if all the additional costs are passed on to the end-users.
Keywords: social acceptance; nuclear power; renewable energy; liquefied natural gas; contingent
valuation method; willingness to pay
1. Introduction
Nuclear power is possibly the most controversial energy source because of the clear advantages
and disadvantages that arise from its inherent technological characteristics. The current figures show
that the amount and ratio of nuclear power have steadily declined worldwide. In 2017 there were
403 nuclear power plants (NPPs) worldwide, 35 less than the 2002 peak of 438. The total installed
capacity was 351 Gigawatt (GW) in 2017, which is less than the 2006 peak of 368 GW. Annual nuclear
electricity generation was 2476 TWh in 2016, about 7% below the historic peak of 2006. The share of
nuclear energy in global power generation was 10.5% in 2016 after declining steadily from a historic
peak of 17.5% in 1996 [1]. At the global level, it seems there is a social consensus for reducing nuclear
power in the long-term. However, countries with a higher share of nuclear power are of the opinion
that the electricity market cannot bear the rapid decrease in nuclear power as it would lead to a sharp
increase in overall power generation costs. Therefore, the status of countries with operating NPPs
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varies depending on the priority with regard to the advantages and disadvantages of nuclear power.
For example, Germany has a firm policy to close existing units, while some countries including the US
are either constructing new units or completing previously suspended construction projects [2].
Nuclear power is also considered a controversial energy source, and most issues can be broken
down into three aspects. First, the economic advantage of nuclear power; that is, whether there
are advantages from the perspective of generation costs. The unit cost of electricity from nuclear
power is considered to be lower than other energy sources, but controversy grows as the external
costs of electricity generation are widely recognized in recent years. Second, the issue of safety (or
danger); that is, the probability of expected accident damage at NPPs such as explosions, melting of
nuclear fuel rods, and nuclear fuel leaks. Radiation leaks from an NPP accident are treated as a much
more serious issue than accidents related to other power plants, primarily because a nuclear leak has
disastrous and widespread human and environmental consequences. This issue was outside public
purview for a few decades after the Three Mile Island incident in 1979 and the Chernobyl accident in
1986, but the Fukushima disaster in 2011 sparked a controversy and the issue has reemerged again
worldwide. Third, the issue of social acceptance of nuclear power, that is, evaluating public perception
of nuclear power. As consumers rarely notice the difference in electricity quality depending on the
energy sources, it has been assumed that they are not very sensitive to the type of energy source.
Energy–environmental problems have recently emerged as an important public interest consideration,
however, public participation and consideration of energy sources from a demand perspective are
becoming increasingly important issues in the energy sector [3]. These three issues are interrelated,
and each country determines its share of nuclear power considering these issues. Proponents of nuclear
power emphasize advantages such as low cost of generation and low CO2 emissions, while opponents
highlight its disadvantages associated with safety hazards.
In sum, nuclear power has clear advantages and disadvantages due to its unique technological
characteristics, and such advantages and disadvantages have a trade-off relationship. Therefore, it
eventually becomes a matter of social consensus and social value judgments whether we take on the
particular risks of nuclear power to receive its benefits, or replace it with other power sources. This
implies that public acceptance and the image of nuclear power, not the technology itself, have become
the core values for a decision on the use of nuclear power. Specifically, social acceptance of nuclear
power is a decisive factor in devising a nuclear power policy.
This study examines public attitude toward the cancellation of a previously scheduled NPP
construction and replacement of nuclear power with other energy sources. The main objective is to
measure average social acceptance and net social benefit in monetary terms. The contingent valuation
method (CVM) and the concept of cost–benefit analysis (CBA) are used as research methodologies,
and empirical analysis is based on the case of South Korea, as it is an appropriate region to provide
related policy implications for other countries. Besides, South Korea is one of the “big five” nuclear
generating countries that account for 70% of all nuclear electricity generated globally [1]. This study
has two marginal contributions compared with existing studies on social acceptance of nuclear power.
First, we assume the replacement of nuclear power with other energy sources. As noted, public
participation has increased in the energy market, and their knowledge of energy sources has also
improved. Therefore, social acceptance for reducing nuclear power can be affected by the type of
power source that replaces such reduced amounts. Second, on the basis of elicited willingness-to-pay
(WTP), a CBA is presented to evaluate the possibility of replacing nuclear power from a financial aspect.
Such analysis can provide practical implications for long-term electricity generation mix planning
at the national level. Especially, as the South Korean government is moving ahead with its “energy
transformation” plan with the aim of reducing a considerable portion of nuclear power, this study
examines the potential for success from the aspect of social acceptance.
This paper consists of five sections. Section 2 briefly introduces the current status of nuclear
power in South Korea, related issues, and summarizes existing studies on social acceptance of nuclear
energy. Section 3 explains the method for eliciting public WTP, and describes the survey design
Sustainability 2018, 10, 3833 3 of 16
for data collection. Section 4 presents the results of empirical analysis; the mean WTP for nuclear
power reduction is suggested and, based on this, financial feasibility of NPP reduction is evaluated.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Background
2.1. Nuclear Power in South Korea: Current Status and Issues
Currently, nuclear power largely contributes to domestic power supply in South Korea, which
is the main reason why this discussion is of such significance. Despite the geographical connection
to the Asian continent, the power supply system in South Korea is isolated like an island because
of the extraordinary political and military situation; namely, the division of the Korean peninsula.
South Korea also imports about 95% of its primary energy as it lacks in natural resources [4]. Given
this situation, nuclear power became an attractive alternative option to support rapid economic
development. With such a historical and social background, nuclear power has played an important
role in the South Korean domestic power supply sector. After the decision to introduce nuclear power
in 1970, South Korea built and began to operate its first 600 MW NPP in 1978. Since then, there was
a steady expansion of nuclear power. As of 2017, there were a total of 24 NPPs located in the four
regions, but only 17 NPPs were in operation due to maintenance and suspension. Moreover, 5 NPPs
were under construction (units 4, 5 and 6 of the Shin-Kori NPP, units 3 and 4 of the Shin-Hanul NPP)
and an additional 4 new NPPs (units 1 and 2 of the Chunji NPP, units 1 and 2 of the Daejin NPP) were
scheduled to be built at that time. Under this policy of nuclear expansion, South Korea’s share of
nuclear power in 2016 accounted for 21.8% of total installed capacity, and 30.0% of total electricity
generation, the second highest ratio after coal-fired power among all available power sources [4].
However, South Korea’s nuclear policy is currently experiencing a rapid change following the
inauguration of the new government in 2017, as it has decided to pursue a nuclear-free policy in the
long-term. The new government plans to reduce the number of NPPs from 24 in 2017 to 28 in 2022, 18
in 2031, and 14 in 2038 [5]. It has also clearly stated that the share of nuclear power in total electricity
generation would be reduced to 23.9% by 2030 (in 2017, nuclear generated about 30% of the country’s
electricity), and would be replaced by renewables and liquefied natural gas (LNG) [6].
Meanwhile, public interest in NPP has grown significantly in South Korea. Recent public
participation in the nuclear power issue is a good example that shows such increased public interest.
In July 2017, the government had launched an ad-hoc committee to gather public opinion on whether
to permanently halt the construction of two NPPs (units 5 and 6 of the Shin-Kori NPP), which were
under construction at that time. About 471 citizens as public representatives had participated in this
committee, and after gathering enough public opinion through a three-day discussion and a four-time
survey, the final recommendations were submitted to the government in October 2017. The committee
recommends resumption of the construction of two NPPs, and the ratio of people who believe that
domestic nuclear power should be reduced or maintained were 53.2% and 35.5%, respectively. As such,
as public interest and participation in nuclear power increases, social acceptance of nuclear power will
have an immediate and strong influence on the South Korean nuclear power policy.
In sum, social acceptance of nuclear power has become an essential factor for a successful nuclear
power policy in South Korea. However, the problem is that unlike economic advantage and safety,
which continue to improve with advancements in technology, social acceptance is affected by a number
of factors and its level shows differences depending on the time and method of investigation. For
example, public opinion in South Korea was in favor of nuclear power during 2009, especially after
winning a large-scale NPP project in the United Arab Emirates, but after the Fukushima disaster
in 2011 it turned against nuclear power. This possible variability requires investigation of social
acceptance of nuclear power, with a consistent method and at regular intervals. This study not only
analyzes social acceptance of nuclear power in recent years but also applies an actual cost–benefit
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perspective and provides meaningful implications for the South Korean government’s future plan to
reduce dependence on nuclear power.
2.2. Literature Review
There are many studies on social acceptance of nuclear power, and interest in this issue has been
growing in recent years. Since 2010, related studies have been rapidly increasing and have introduced
diverse perspectives on the issue. Examples include; proposing new indicators that quantify public
acceptance of nuclear power [7], analyzing the impact of the Fukushima disaster on the acceptance
of nuclear power [8–11], identifying public attitude on nuclear power using social media data [12],
suggesting an international comparison of public acceptance of nuclear energy [13], and identifying
the determinants of acceptance of nuclear power [14–19].
Besides the abovementioned studies, other studies having a closer relationship with this study
estimated WTP for a situation regarding nuclear power and analyzed social acceptance in monetary
terms. Most of these studies employed the stated preference method, such as choice modeling and
CVM. In this section, we introduce the studies using CVM, as they can provide useful insights to our
study because of methodological similarity.
Jun et al. [20] estimated the social value of nuclear energy and people’s WTP for nuclear energy
in South Korea. Respondents were divided into two groups: one group was provided information on
nuclear energy such as safety hazards, economic, and environmental benefits; the other group was
not given this information. Results show that each group has a mean WTP of USD 0.59/month and
USD 0.35/month, respectively. This implies that the social value of nuclear energy increased when
adequate information is provided to the public.
Liao et al. [21] analyzed Taiwanese WTP for nuclear power. The authors divided the respondents
into two groups based on whether they supported the increase or decrease in nuclear energy’s share
in electricity generation, and elicited each group’s mean WTP for its preferred policy. Respondents
who supported the increase and decrease in nuclear energy’s share in electricity generation was 223
and 241, respectively, and similar to each other. The median WTP of each group was USD 146.31/year
and USD 164.85/year, respectively, which are also similar to each other. Based on these results, the
authors concluded that Taiwanese did not support any dramatic increase or decrease in nuclear power,
and claimed that the share of nuclear power should be maintained for a while.
Sun and Zhu [22] analyzed Chinese WTP for avoiding the construction of NPPs in their
neighborhood. In order to analyze the impact of information about nuclear energy on WTP, respondents
were divided into two groups comprising of people who were informed and those who were not
informed of the pros and cons of nuclear power. The results showed that the mean WTP of respondents
who did not have information was USD 0.1501/kWh, while the mean WTP of respondents who
had such information was USD 0.1403/kWh. Based on these results, the authors suggested that
comprehensive information would increase public support for nuclear power. Similarly, in their
subsequent study, Sun et al. [23] and Sun et al. [24] found that distance of dwelling (buffer zone) from
NPPs and the perception of security also influenced public acceptance of NPPs.
Yun et al. [25] investigated whether people’s image of an NPP, their perception of safety,
and scientific background related to their WTP for reducing risk in a nuclear power plant. Results
showed that the mean WTP for all the respondents was about USD 17.014/month. After dividing the
samples into several groups, the results showed that people with a higher scientific background and
a good image of NPPs tend to have lower WTP. On the other hand, no clear relationship was found
between the safety level and mean WTP.
Park et al. [26] analyzed Koreans’ WTP for replacing nuclear power and fossil energy with
renewable energy. It was found that each individual household was willing to pay USD 85 on average,
and this figure corresponded to USD 16.1 billion of renewable energy value in South Korea. Further, it
also turned out that a person who was younger, lived further from a NPP, a householder, and those
with higher income preferred renewable energy to others.
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Lee et al. [27] estimated people’s WTP for replacing traditional energy sources such as coal-fired
and nuclear power with renewable sources in Korea. The study results showed that Korean consumers
were willing to pay an additional USD 3.3/month and USD 3.0/month on their electricity bill for
replacing nuclear and coal-fired power with renewables, respectively. If these amounts are aggregated
with total WTP for installing new photovoltaic capacity annually at the national level, then 372 MW of
nuclear power and 339 MW coal-fired power can be substituted every year. The authors concluded
that although there is a huge increase in Korean consumers’ WTP for renewable energy, it is still lower
than countries such as Japan, the UK, the US, and Italy.
From among the abovementioned studies, research studies conducted by Park et al. [26] and
Lee et al. [27] are similar to our study, as they used CVM as a research method and suggested the
notion of replacement of nuclear power with other energy sources. However, this study makes two
marginal contributions that differentiate it from the other two studies. First, the two existing studies
mainly focused on “increase in renewable energy” than “decrease in nuclear power.” Although nuclear
power and renewable energy sources are the main options in the future energy sector [28], it is unlikely
that the reduced amount of nuclear power will be completely replaced by renewables. Therefore, it
is more reasonable to open up the possibilities of replacing the reduced nuclear power with various
other energy sources, and to examine the difference in WTP for the other energy sources. Second,
through a CBA, this study quantitatively estimates the amount of nuclear power that can be replaced
with other energy sources without incurring any financial losses. This will provide important new
policy implications, which the previous studies did not contribute.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Contingent Valuation Method: The Double-Bounded Dichotomous Choice Spike Model
It is relatively easy to economically evaluate market goods because they have a market price.
Non-market goods do not have a market price, however, another approach can be used to access their
value. The concept of CVM has been widely used to estimate the monetary value of such non-market
goods by using stated preference data [29,30].
The CVM presents a hypothetical situation regarding a non-market good to respondents,
and explicitly asks their WTP for accepting the situation. The common formats of eliciting monetary
value in CVM are open-ended questions, bidding games, payment card questions, and dichotomous
choice (DC) questions. Among them, the DC method has been most widely used where respondents
are presented with a given price and they only have to make a judgment about whether or not to pay
for it [31].
The DC format facilitates respondents’ valuation task, minimizes non-response, avoids outliers,
and reduces starting-point bias. It can be divided into single-bounded, one and one-half bounded,
and double-bounded formats depending on the number of WTP questions. The double-bounded
dichotomous choice (DBDC) asks the respondent his/her intention to accept the suggested status with
the given price. If the respondent answers “Yes” (or “No”), the same question is asked using the higher
bid price (or the lower bid price). The one and one-half bound dichotomous choice (OOHB DC) is
similar to the DBDC, but if the response is “No”, no further questions are asked. The single-bound
dichotomous choice (SBDC) asks the respondent only one WTP question.
The DBDC formats are known to be more efficient than SBDC and OOHB DC as more information
can be elicited about each respondent’s WTP [32,33]. Specifically, the extra information gained from
the follow-up questions of DBDC significantly improves the precision of the estimated WTP and these
improvements are achieved without additional survey cost. Based on such advantages, we also use the
DBDC formats to obtain data on respondents’ WTP. Some CVM studies indicated that the responses
to the first price may sometimes be inconsistent with the responses to the second in the DBDC and
the OOHB can reduce the inconsistency of the DBDC. However, we have not found any evidence of
inconsistency in our DBDC survey results.
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The DBDC is currently the most widely-used WTP elicitation method and it has been applied to
estimate WTP for nuclear power related situations. For example, Sun et al. [23] and Sun et al. [24] used
the DBDC to estimate Chinese people’s WTP to prevent a nuclear power plant from being constructed
in their neighborhood. Specifically, they used a DBDC format survey that asks the respondents if they
would pay a certain bid amount (Chinese Yuan) for electricity tariffs to avoid building a nuclear power
plant and provides the follow-up questions based on their responses.
In our DBDC survey, respondents are asked whether they are willing to pay a certain additional
amount on their electricity bills or not, if the seven 1-GW NPPs (corresponding to 52,122 GWh/year by
assuming 85% of availability factor of an NPP; The average availability factor of an NPP was 84.82% in
2015 in South Korea [34].), which are scheduled to be built in the near future according to the national
energy plan, are replaced with other power sources. If a respondent i answers “Yes” to the first bid
of electricity bills (Ai), the second bid (AHi ) will be twice larger than the first bid. If a respondent i
answers “No” to the first bid, the second bid (ALi ) will be half of the first bid.
Some respondents may have zero WTP for the good which is subject to valuation. It means that
respondents with No-No answers in the above DBDC format consist of two different groups: one is
with zero WTP; and the other is with a positive WTP between zero and ALi . Therefore, respondents
who answered No-No to the above DBDC format are given the third follow-up question: “Are not you
willing to pay anything at all?” In sum, there are a total of five possible patterns of responses in our
CV survey: “Yes-Yes”, “Yes-No”, “No-Yes”, “No-No-Yes”, and “No-No-No”.
The DBDC CV spike model, which is used in this study, is a good alternative to allow a zero WTP
response [35,36]. In this model, a Hicksian compensating surplus is induced using Hanemann’s utility
difference model [37]. A respondent’s response can be considered as a function of his or her true WTP,
which is a random variable denoted as C with a cumulative distribution function defined as GC(·; θ),
where θ is a vector of parameters. In this case, the probability of five observable response patterns can
be represented as Equation (1).
P(Yes−Yes) = P(Ci ≥ AHi ) = 1− GC(AHi ; θ)
P(Yes− No) = P(Ai < Ci ≤ AHi ) = GC(AHi ; θ)− GC(Ai; θ)
P(No−Yes) = P(ALi < Ci ≤ Ai) = GC(Ai; θ)− GC(ALi ; θ)
P(No− No−Yes) = P(0 < Ci < ALi ) = GC(ALi ; θ)− GC(0; θ)
P(No− No−Yes) = P(0 < Ci < ALi ) = GC(ALi ; θ)− GC(0; θ)
(1)
To estimate the distribution of WTP, we assume that WTP is distributed as a logistic on the positive
axis with θ = (a, b). Assuming respondents’ choice for their utility maximization, the log-likelihood
function of the DBDC CV spike model is represented as Equation (2) [36].
ln(L) =
N
∑
i=1
{
IYYi ln
[
1− GC
(
AHi ; θ
)]
+ IYNi ln
[
GC
(
AHi ; θ
)− GC(Ai; θ)]
+INYi ln
[
GC(Ai; θ)− GC
(
ALi ; θ
)]
+ INNYi ln
[
GC
(
ALi ; θ
)− GC(0; θ)]
+INNNi lnGC(0; θ)
}
where
GC(Ai; θ) =

[1+ exp(a− bAi)]−1, A > 0
[1+ exp(a)]−1, A = 0
0, A < 0
(2)
In Equation (2), IYYi , I
YN
i , I
NY
i , I
NNY
i , I
NNN
i are binary-valued indicator variables that inform
which response the respondent will choose among the five response patterns. For example, if
a respondent i answered “Yes-Yes”, IYYi is 1 while the other indicator variables are 0.
The spike is defined by [1+ exp(a)]−1 and it indicates the share of zero WTP responses in the
sample. And the mean WTP is computed as (1/b) ln[1+ exp(a)] in a DBDC CV spike model [37].
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We also utilize an additional model where a in Equation (2) is decomposed into a + x′iβ in order
to analyze the effects of various covariates, such as respondents’ sociodemographic characteristics
and their attitude toward WTP for NPPs. Here, x′i is the vector of the respondent’s attitudes or
socio-demographic variables and β is the parameter vector to be estimated.
3.2. Survey and Data Collection
The survey was conducted by a professional survey company (Gallup Korea). We only surveyed
householders or their spouses who are liable for payment of the assumed increase in electricity bills.
In order to provide sufficient information about nuclear power, we conducted face-to-face interviews,
which offer higher flexibility and greater sample control than other survey modes and also enable
complex questionnaire structures [33]. A sample was drawn using non-random sampling; purposive
quota-sampling on the basis of respondents’ gender, age, and geographical location, to maintain
a component ratio that is representative of the actual population of Korea.
The survey consists of three parts. The first part includes a few preliminary questions, such as the
respondent’s satisfaction level with the electricity service, attitude toward environmental problems,
nuclear power, and so on; all these factors may affect a respondent’s acceptance of nuclear power. Such
preliminary questions call the respondents’ attention to the survey before the main CV questions, and
enable us to examine the determinants of WTP for replacing nuclear power.
The second part includes key WTP questions in the CVM. Above all, the hypothetical situation of
replacing NPPs with other electric power sources is described in detail in order for a respondent to
fully understand the objectives of the survey. The description includes amount of electricity supply
from nuclear power, number of NPPs, and the pros and cons of nuclear and other power sources,
among others. Before asking the key WTP question, we require the respondents to state which power
source they prefer as a substitute for seven NPPs, between fossil fuels and renewables. It is assumed
that the seven NPPs will be replaced by the power source that the respondent chooses, and this is fully
recognized by respondents. The final key WTP question is “Is your household willing to pay a certain
additional amount of electricity bills for cancelling the construction of the scheduled seven 1-GW NPPs
and replacing them with the power source that you prefer?” For a closer analysis, two types of initial
bid amounts, that is, KRW 2000 (USD 1.87) and KRW 3500 (USD 3.28) are used. We take the US dollar
equivalent as of January 2018 (USD 1 = KRW 1067.60) [38]. Those initial bids are selected by referring
to the WTP and CV studies in the energy sector in South Korea [27,39,40]. This simple bid assignments
based on limited information about the underlying distribution of WTP is most popular in practice
because of its simplicity and lack of informational requirements. As noted in Section 3.1, the DBDC is
used as an elicitation format, and the spike model is adopted in order to deal with the possibility that a
respondent will have a WTP value of 0.
The third and last part inquiries about the respondent’s socio-demographic characteristics such
as gender, age, education, income level, and so on. This enables us to examine the impact of these
variables on social acceptance of reducing nuclear power.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Preliminary Survey Results and Willingess-to-Pay Response
This section describes the main findings of the preliminary questionnaires. First, the degree of
overall interest in electricity service was asked in a 5-point Likert scale (all the results in this section are
measured in a 5-point Likert scale, unless otherwise stated). Nearly 75.3% of respondents answered
“very interested,” which confirms Koreans’ close interest in the electric power sector. Moreover,
the mean score of questions regarding the importance of environmental protection and the seriousness
of climate change was 4.35 and 4.37 (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), respectively, so the
respondents recognized the need for proper measures to the environmental problems. Next, a few
basic questions were asked in order to outline public opinion on nuclear power. The mean score of
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the question about whether nuclear power is dangerous was 3.69, which is close to the “agree (score
4).” The mean score of the question about whether nuclear power should be expanded in South Korea
was 3.10, which is close to “neither agree nor disagree,” but its standard deviation was 0.85, which is
larger than that of the other questions. This corresponds with the result of Huh and Lee [3] who found
a larger heterogeneity in social preferences for nuclear power than for other energy sources.
In the main CV section, 400 respondents were divided into two groups, and one of the two types
of initial bids was presented to the respondents in each group. Table 1 shows the distribution of
respondents’ responses by initial bid amount. It is found in Table 1 that the number of respondents
with Yes-Yes responses decreases and that of No-No-(Yes or No) responses increases, as the initial bid
increases. For example, the ratio of Yes-Yes responses is 11.9% in the case of initial bids of KRW 2000
(USD 1.87) while it is a mere 1.0% in the case of initial bids of KRW 3500 (USD 3.28). On the other hand,
the ratio of No-No-(Yes or No) responses is 32.2% in the case of initial bids of KRW 2000 (USD 1.87)
while it nearly doubles (59.6%) in the case of initial bids of KRW 3500 (USD 3.28). This tendency proves
that the quality of data obtained from our CV survey is appropriate for the WTP analysis.
The high ratio of respondents with No-No-No responses, 40.8%, deserves our attention. This
implies that in South Korea there are many people whose utilities are not affected by the replacement
or reduction of nuclear power. Zero responses are often found in DBDC-CV studies as a corner solution
of consumers’ utility-maximization when the goods to be valued do not in any way contribute to the
individual’s utility [36]. Therefore, the spike model is used in this study.
Table 1. Distribution of responses by bid amount.
Initial Bid
(KRW)
Number of Responses (%)
Yes-Yes Yes-No No-Yes No-No-Yes No-No-No Total
2000 24 (11.9) 70 (34.7) 43 (21.3) 5 (2.5) 60 (29.7) 202 (100)
3500 2 (1.0) 47 (23.7) 31 (15.7) 15 (7.6) 103 (52.0) 198 (100)
Total 26 (6.5) 117 (29.3) 74 (18.5) 20 (5.0) 163 (40.8) 400 (100)
4.2. Estimation Results: Public Acceptance for Reducing NPPs
Two types of analysis models are used for eliciting WTP. Model 1 estimates the mean WTP and it
does not consider various explanatory variables that may have potential impact on the respondent’s
WTP. Model 2 includes the respondents’ socio-demographic and psychological characteristics to
identify the determinants of the mean WTP. Table 2 shows the analysis results of the two models,
which is the estimation result of the bid function represented as Equation (1).
Table 2. Estimation results of the two models.
Model 1
(without Covariates)
Model 2
(with Covariates)
Constant 0.5470 *** (0.0941) −2.5728 *** (0.9196)
Bid amount −0.0005 *** (0.0000) −0.0006 *** (0.0000)
Gender - −0.1887 (0.1858)
Age - 0.0040 (0.0110)
Monthly household income - −0.0009 (0.0063)
Education - 0.3121 (0.2017)
Type of alternative power source - 0.7844 ** (0.3429)
Preferred method of payment - −0.6947 *** (0.1884)
Perceived seriousness about climate change - 0.4397 *** (0.1370)
Perceived level of knowledge about nuclear power - 0.1792 (0.1175)
Log likelihood 577.8588 560.7090
Spike 0.3666 *** (0.0218) 0.2995 *** (0.0640)
Wald statistics (p-values) 281.7678 (0.0000) 21.8896 (0.0000)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses; ***, ** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% level,
respectively; p-values correspond to the null hypothesis that all parameters are jointly zero.
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First, in Model 1 (model without covariates), all parameter estimates are statistically significant at
1% level. Based on the Wald statistic, the null hypotheses and the parameter estimates are all zero and
are also rejected at 1% level, which confirms the statistical significance of the model. The minus sign in
the bid amount estimate means that a higher bid has a negative impact on the possibility of obtaining
a “Yes” response, which is common in CV studies. Therefore, in the CV survey on nuclear power
replacement, there is an increasing preference among respondents as the initial bid amount decreases.
The spike is estimated as 0.37, which is close to the ratio of No-No-No responses, 40%, in
Table 1. This confirms the appropriateness of the spike model, and this suitability is also confirmed in
Model 2. Therefore, policy makers should be conscious of people with zero WTP, specifically when
interpreting WTP for nuclear power reduction and when devising related policies based on the results
of the analysis.
Next, the estimation results for Model 2—the model with covariates—are reported in the last
column of Table 2. To identify the determinants of the public’s WTP for replacing nuclear power,
it is necessary to first consider the covariates which should be included in the model. Existing
studies found that a variety of psychological, emotional, and socio-demographic factors influence the
acceptance of nuclear power [14–19], and we select a few covariates with reference to these studies.
Table 3 summarizes the basic statistics of the covariates included in Model 2. According to Table 3,
respondents show overwhelming support for renewables as substitutes for nuclear power and prefer
an additional amount in their electricity bill as a payment method. Respondents are also aware of
the seriousness of climate change, and the wide variations are observed in their perceived level of
knowledge about nuclear power. Among the various covariates, whether the knowledge about nuclear
power is a determinant of social acceptance has been an important issue, and previous studies have
presented different results and opinions [13,14,18,41]. According to Table 3, the calculated mean
of perceived knowledge about nuclear power is slightly higher than average, which means most
of respondents are not nuclear professionals. Such knowledge level of the survey respondents is
appropriate for the study’s objective which is to analyze the acceptance of the general public for
reducing nuclear power plants. We also intentionally excluded nuclear professionals and stakeholders
belonging to the relevant companies or organizations when constructing the respondents’ sample, in
order to focus on the analysis of laypeople’s acceptance.
Table 3. Definitions and sample statistics of variables.
Variables Definitions Mean StandardDeviation
Gender Gender of the respondent (0 = male; 1 = female) 0.50 0.50
Age Age of the respondent 40.38 9.78
Monthly household
income
Monthly household income of the respondent (unit:
100,000 KRW) 40.65 14.69
Education Educational level of the respondent (0 = Less thanhigh school; 1 = More than university) 0.60 0.49
Type of alternative
power source
Which power sources do you prefer as a substitute
for electricity from the 7 NPPs scheduled to be built
by 2035? (0 = fossil fuel; 1 = renewables)
0.90 0.30
Preferred method of
payment
If you have to pay a certain amount of money for
replacing nuclear power with other sources, which
type of payment method would you prefer? (0 =
additional electricity bills; 1 = a new type of taxation)
0.44 0.50
Perceived seriousness
about climate change
As of now, the problem of climate change is serious.
(From strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 5) 4.37 0.66
Perceived level of
knowledge about
nuclear power
I know well enough what nuclear power is.(From
strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 5) 3.42 0.82
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Looking again at the estimation results of Model 2 in Table 2, the influence of each covariate on
WTP is confirmed. According to the results, respondents who prefer renewables to fossil fuels as
a substitute for nuclear power, those who prefer additional electricity bills to a new type of taxation,
and those who see the seriousness of climate change have a higher WTP for nuclear power reduction
and replacement. The impact of substituting power sources on WTP implies that when the Korean
government pursues its energy transformation policy, there should be social consensus on the type of
energy source that will replace the reduced amount of nuclear power. Therefore, potential opposition
due to increases in the electricity bill can be partly relieved by replacing the reduced share of nuclear
power with renewable energy sources. Specifically, the overall direction of the Korean government’s
energy transformation policy is appropriate from the perspective of social acceptance, as it plans to
reduce the share of nuclear and coal-fired power and increase it with renewable electricity. Further, in
the case of the payment method, the imposition of new taxes is not a good choice as it would not only
entail social costs but also lowers the acceptance level. The payment vehicle has been an important issue
in CV studies, as it offers the context for payment [42,43]. It seems that respondents prefer a familiar
method of payment. This is partly because the use of levies on taxes is less common in countries other
than the US [44]. In Table 2, it is interesting that respondents recognizing the seriousness of the climate
change problem had higher WTP for nuclear power reduction because nuclear power has a low GHG
emission intensity and is considered a good alternative to cope with climate change [45–47]. This result
seemingly stems from the fact that people who are more cognizant of climate change have a higher
preference for renewables over nuclear power. Unlike the aforementioned covariates, it is found that
gender, age, income, education, and the knowledge level of a respondent do not make any statistical
differences in WTP. This suggests that the Korean government does not have to focus on demographic
factors when formulating publicity strategies for coping with possible social opposition to increases in
electricity bills.
Finally, the monthly mean WTP for replacing nuclear power is calculated from Model 1, which is
statistically significant at 1% level. On average, a Korean household is willing to pay an additional
KRW 1922.45/month (USD 1.80/month) for replacing the seven 1-GW NPPs (52,122 GWh/year of
electricity generation) with other energy sources (Table 4). This amount is about 3.5% of the monthly
average electricity bill a family of four in South Korea pays (KRW 55,000; 350 kWh usages). According
to the Korean government, electricity bills are expected to increase 1.3% by 2022 and 10.9% by 2030 [6].
Although several other factors such as general price level and rate of increase in wage growth should
be considered, the social acceptance level fluctuates with time and different socio-economic events,
and the possible increase in electricity bills from nuclear power reduction will not lead to problems
in the short term but may provoke social resistance in the long term, based on the elicited WTP in
this study.
Table 4. Willingness to pay estimates with 95% confidence interval.
Monthly Mean WTP
per Household
Monthly Median WTP
per Household t-Value
95% Confidence
Interval
KRW 1922.45
(USD 1.80)
KRW 1913.64
(USD 1.79) 10.52 ***
KRW 1639.23–2237.24
(USD 1.54–2.10)
Notes: The confidence intervals are computed by the use of Monte Carlo simulation method proposed by Krinsky
and Robb [48] with 5000 replications; Figure 1 is the histogram of Monte Carlo simulation results; *** indicates
statistical significance at the 1% level.
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4.3. Cost–Benefit Analysis: Financial Feasibility of Nuclear Power Plants Reduction
Although the mean WTP for reducing the number of NPPs is by itself important, the net social
benefit at the national level may have greater significance to pol cy makers. M eover, it is a major
co cern w ther the replacement of nuclear power will be finan ially f a ible or not. This section
alculates t aggregated economic benefits of reducing NPP, and based on thi , assesses the de irability
and feasibility of replacing nuclear pow r with ther energy sources.
The erm ‘benefits’ used in this study means economic ben fits which is th total economic value
(TEV) of any cha ge in w llbeing due to a policy r project. The net sum of all the relevant WTPs
defines such TEV [33]. The economic valuation techniques that ar mainly used in economics include
revealed preference, stated preferen e, and benefit transfer, and CVM used in this study is one of th
pres ntativ stated preference methods. Based on the theories of welfar economics, many previous
ene gy-related tudies adopted the method of calculating the aggregate benefits of a policy or project
by estimating and aggregating the individual WTP [26,49–51].
Once the conditions of representativeness of the sample frame and a high response rate of
the survey are met, the mean WTP c n be aggregated into an economic benefit [31]. Fur her,
in this study eets these two conditions. If these conditions ar me , the aggregation process
s simple; the aggregated benefit is calculated by multiplyi g mean WTP by th total number of
Korean households [33]. Nationwide, the total number of Korean households was 21.63 million i
2017 [52], so that the annual to al economic benefit of ducing the seven 1-GW NPPs n Korea (52,1 2
GW /year of electricity generation) is approximat ly KRW 498.99 billion (USD 467.40 million) (Table 5).
Converting the un ts, this amount corresp nds to KRW 71.28 billion/GW (USD 66.77 million), nd
KRW 9.57 million/GWh (USD 8.97 thousand/GWh) (=KRW 9.57/kWh).
Table 5. Annual economic benefit by substituting nuclear power in Korea.
Annual Mean WTP per
Household
Number of Households
(2017)
Annual Economic Benefit by
Substituting Nuclear Power in Korea
KRW 23,069.42
(USD 21.61) 21.63 million
KRW 498.99 billi n
(USD 467.40 million)
As the unit cost of electricity from nuclear power is lower than that from other energy sources,
there i a stro g possibility of increase i total generation costs when replacing nucl ar power with
other sources in a fixed amount of domestic electricity demand. As described i Section 2.1, as the
new K rean government plans t replace nuc ar power with LNG and enewables, t is necessary
to conduct an ex-ante evaluation of the costs and benefits from such a policy. This study u es the
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unit price of settlement (UPS) to evaluate the Korean government’s energy transformation policy
from the public’s perspective. If the electricity purchase cost of Korea Electric Power Corporation
(KEPCO) is increased because of replacing the NPPs with other energy sources, the increased cost of
KEPCO can be transferred to consumers. Moreover, since the UPS has been stable for a long time, we
assume that the UPS will not be changed much in the future. In 2016, South Korea’s UPS for electricity
from nuclear, renewables, and LNG was KRW 67.91/kWh (USD 0.0636/kWh), KRW 102.26/kWh
(USD 0.0958/kWh), and KRW 100.13/kWh (USD 0.0938/kWh), respectively [53]. In other words, the
replacement of nuclear power with electricity from renewables or LNG costs KRW 34.35/kWh (USD
0.0322/kWh) or KRW 32.22/kWh (USD 0.0302/kWh), respectively. As the annual total economic
benefit is KRW 9.57/kWh (USD 0.0090/kWh), the cost of replacing nuclear power with renewables
or LNG are larger than the benefits at the current level of acceptance. The benefits–costs of replacing
nuclear power with renewables and LNG are thus KRW −24.78/kWh (USD 0.0232/kWh), and KRW
–22.65/kWh (USD 0.0212/kWh), respectively. In order for the mean WTP to cover the additional cost
of generation for reducing NPPs, the UPS of renewable and LNG electricity should be lowered to KRW
77.48/kWh (USD 0.0726/kWh) or people’s mean WTP should be increased.
Next, we calculate how much it would cost the Korean government to replace 52,122 GWh of
electricity—the amount of annual power expected to be generated by the seven 1-GW NPPs—with
electricity from renewables or LNG. The cost–benefit analysis is also conducted based on the results
(Table 6).
Table 6. Cost–benefit analysis for replacing nuclear power in Korea.
Amount of Replaced
Nuclear Power Generation
Aggregated
Benefit
Replacement with
Renewables Replacement with LNG
Additional
Cost
Net Benefit
(B-C)
Additional
Cost Net Benefit (B-C)
Seven 1-GW
NPPs 52,122 Gwh
KRW 498.99
billion
(USD 467.40
million)
KRW
1790.39
billion
(USD 1.68
billion)
KRW
−1291.40
billion
(USD 1.21
billion)
KRW 1679.37
billion
(USD 1.57
billion)
KRW −1180.38
billion
(USD 1.11 billion)
If the Korean government cancels the construction of the seven NPPs and replaces them with
other energy sources, it will lead to KRW 498.99 billion (USD 467.40 million) of social benefits, which is
calculated from the mean WTP of Korean households. On the other hand, if the corresponding amount
of nuclear power generation is replaced with renewables or LNG, an additional cost of KRW 1790.39
(USD 1.68) or KRW 1679.37 (USD 1.57) will be required, which is calculated from the differences
in UPS. Therefore, the annual cost of such replacement is KRW 1291.40 billion (USD 1.21 billion),
or KRW 1180.38 billion (USD 1.11 billion) larger than its benefit. These amounts are about 3% of
the total annual cost of electricity generation in South Korea, which is about KRW 42 trillion (USD
39.34 billion). Therefore, as the cost of replacing seven 1-GW nuclear power plants are larger than its
benefits, moderate levels of social resistance are expected if all the additional costs are passed on to
the end-users.
5. Conclusions
This study analyzed the social acceptance of canceling the scheduled construction of seven
NPPs and using alternative energy sources for power supply and evaluated the financial viability
of such planning. This study also examined the feasibility of the Korean government’s energy
transformation plan and suggested a methodological framework, which is applicable to other energy
markets. The CVM with DBDC spike model is used to elicit respondents’ mean WTP.
The results showed that an average Korean household was willing to pay additional KRW
1922.45/month (USD 1.80/month) for replacing the seven 1-GW NPPs with other energy sources,
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which is about 3.5% of the current electricity bill. As noted in Section 3.2, this is the respondents’
mean WTP when the seven NPPs are replaced either by fossil fuels or renewables depending
on the respondent’s stated choice. According to Table 3, however, most respondents preferred
renewables to fossil fuels as substitutes for nuclear power. Therefore, the reported mean WTP
can be interpreted as a similar amount to the South Koreans’ mean WTP when NPPs are replaced
with renewables. The estimation results of a model with covariates showed that respondents’
experiential and psychological factors are more important than demographic factors in explaining
their WTP. The annual total economic benefit of nuclear power replacement was approximately KRW
498.99 billion (USD 467.40 million). Cost–benefit analysis suggested that the annual costs of nuclear
power replacement is KRW 1291.40 billion (USD 1.21 billion) or KRW 1180.38 billion (USD 1.11 billion)
larger than the benefits, which is about 3% of the total annual electricity generation costs in South
Korea. As additional costs of nuclear power replacement cannot be fully covered by the mean WTP of
the current acceptance level, further efforts such as lowering the UPS of alternative energy sources and
improving people’s WTP for possible increase in electricity bills are desirable.
Several research limitations deserve to be noted. First, there is no choice but to mention the
inherent limitations of the research methodology. The CVM uses stated preference data, which do
not necessarily coincide with respondents’ behavior in real-life situations due to their hypothetical
nature [54]. The DBDC formats are also subject to some biases because of possible correlation between
responses to the two bids. In this case, one-and-a-half bound DC can be an alternative [55]. Selection
of the two initial bids in our DC CVM survey also needs to be addressed. The DBDC format has been
proved to be sensitive to starting point bias [56]. We used a simple bid assignments approach based
on its simplicity and lack of informational requirements. However, use of different method of bid
set design [57–59] or a pre-testing can be considered as an alternative for a more elaborated initial
bid set. Second, cost–benefit analysis is conducted in terms of suggesting an analytical framework
and, thus, there is room for improvement by introducing additional cost–benefit factors and more
elaborate assumptions. Specifically, we did not include elements other than direct generation costs;
for example, a sunk cost of NPPs under construction, backward linkage effects of switching to other
energy sources, and possible job creation, among others. Another factor to be mentioned is that the
plan to reduce NPPs is only part of the Korean government’s energy transformation policy (of course,
reduction of nuclear power is at the core of the energy transformation policy in South Korea. Moreover,
the situation in this study is similar to the Korean government’s plan on reducing seven of the 1-GW
nuclear power capacity from 27.5 GW in 2022 to 20.4 GW in 2030 [6]) and, thus, there will be additional
causes for variation in electricity bills.
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